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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
an additional consideration in protecting the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the public. 1
It is evident that until a judicially recognized purpose exists which
will support the exercise of the police power to regulate erection of ad-
vertising signs along highways and streets, the result in Ghaster Proper-
ties, Inc. v. PrestonW2 is inevitable. And most text authorities agree that
this purpose may not be discovered until the judiciary includes aesthetic
considerations as a necessary component of the general welfare. 3
DAVID L. SIMIELE
INCOM TAXATION - DEDUCTIONS FOR TRAVELLING EXPENSES -
1954 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 162(a) (2)
Suzanne Waggener, CCH 1963 Tax Ct. Rep.
(22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) Dec. 25902(M) (Jan. 3, 1963)
In Suzanne Waggener,' the petitioner maintained a permanent resi-
dence with her parents in Joplin, Missouri, and worked part-time as a
clerk-typist while attending Joplin Junior College. During the summer
of 1958, she moved to Dodge City, Kansas, and worked part-time as a
clerk-typist while attending Dodge City Junior College. While in Dodge
City, Kansas, the petitioner applied to the United States Department of
the Interior for a summer job in Washington, D.C. She was accepted
for employment, worked in Washington, D.C. for the summer of 1959,
then voluntarily terminated her employment and returned to her par-
ent's home in Joplin, Missouri.
The petitioner attempted to deduct her expenses for travel to and
from Washington, D. C., in addition to the cost of her meals and lodging
while working there. The tax court denied her deductions, holding that
CoNTEMP. PROB. 812 (1955); Kelsey, Place of Aesthetics in Comprehensive Zoning in Massa-
chusetts, 43 MASS. L.Q. 60 (1958); Mee, Validity of, Municipal Regulation of Outdoor Ad-
vertising, 4 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 323 (1939); Metzenbaurn, Esthetic Zoning - The Trend
of the Law, 7 W. RES. L. REv. 171 (1956); Profirt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, 16
CORNBLL L.Q. 151 (1931); Note, Billboard Regulation Along the New York Thruway, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 647 (1962).
21. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. C.P.
1962); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930);
Stoner McCray Sys. v. Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956); Gustafson Co.
v. Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950); Larchmont v. Sutton, 30 Misc.2d
245, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Village of Larchmont v. Levine, 225 N.Y.S.2d 452
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Criterion Service,
Inc. v. East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53
Dauph. Co. Rep. 91 (Pa. 1942).
22. 184 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
23. See note 20 supra.
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these expenses were purely personal and did not fall within the provisions
of section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code.2
In reaching this conclusion, the court in Suzanne Waggener followed
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Flowers v. Commis-
sioner.3 There, the Court established three conditions essential to a valid
claim for travel and living expenses as a deduction from income under
the provisions of section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code:
(1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary travelling
expense as that term is generally understood. This includes such items
as transportation fares and food and lodging expenses incurred while
travelling.
(2) The expense must be incurred while away from home.
(3) The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business. This
means that there must be a direct connection between the expenditure
and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his
employer. Moreover, such an expenditure must be necessary or appro-
priate to the development of the trade or business 4
The tax court in Suzanne Waggener said that neither the second nor
third conditions of the rule in the Flowers decision were met. The court
held that the petitioner's duties as a derk-typist did not make it necessary
for her to travel in connection with her employer's business. The ex-
penses incurred were not in pursuit of her trade or business since similar
clerk-typist positions were available in most localities in the United States.
The court further stated:
We have construed "home" to mean the principal post of duty of a
taxpayer, especially where the taxpayer has his home for his own con-
venience at a place distant from his business.5
Since the term "home," as employed in section 162 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, was construed to mean "principal post of duty," it was felt
that the petitioner had moved her "home" to Washington, D. C. when
accepting the summer job there.
There is a conflict of authority among the federal circuit courts relat-
ing to the correct interpretation of the term "home" as employed in sec-
tion 162(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code. Courts in accord with
the tax court's decision in Suzanne Waggener define "home" to mean the
1. Suzanne Waggener, CCH 1963 TAx CT. REp. (22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) Dec. 25902 (M)
(Jan. 3, 1963).
2. "Sec. 162 TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES
(a) IN GENERAL - There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, in-
cluding -(2) Travelling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodg-
ing) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business...
3. 326 U.S. 465 (1945).
4. Ibid.
5. Suzanne Waggener, CCH 1963 TAx CT. REp. (22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) Dec. 25902 (M)
(Jan. 3, 1963).
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principal post of duty of the taxpayer.6 Other courts have held that the
term "home" as employed in the Internal Revenue Code should not be
so narrowly construed. Instead, "home" should be interpreted as it is
ordinarily understood.' Thus in Wallace v. Commissioner,8 the court
stated in its opinion:
We have found nothing in section 23(a) (1) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code § 23 (a) (1) or in the earlier
legislation from which this Code provision is derived which denotes any
interest by Congress to attribute to the word "home" as there used any
unusual or novel meaning.
Therefore the Tax Court in its effort to differentiate between the
conceded "domicile" and "legal residence" of both petitioners after their
marriage and their "home" at such time, has, we think invaded the
domain of Congress in construing the term "home" as used in the statute
under consideration as meaning "the taxpayer's place of business, em-
ployment or post or station at which he is employed." Had Congress in-
tended that the word "home" should not be understood and applied in
its ordinary sense but rather as meaning the locale of employment of the
taxpayer, it would have used a more appropriate term to express such
an intent.9
The United States Supreme Court has never adjudicated this precise
issue. However, at least one Supreme Court Justice has expressed his
opinion on how the term "home" should be construed. In Peurifoy v.
Commissioner,1" Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, felt that the
court should have decided this question and that the term should be con-
strued in its ordinary sense."l
In the Peurifoy case, the Court recognized an exception to the three-
fold test of the Flowers case. The Court stated:
Generally, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct unreimbursed travel ex-
penses under this subsection only when they are required by the "ex-
igencies of business." Commissioner v. Flowers . . . Application of
this general rule would require affirmance of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in the present case.
6. O'Toole v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1957); Amoroso v. Commissioner,
193 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952); Berlow v. Commissioner, 243
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1948).
7. Burns v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1961); Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407
(9th Cir. 1944); Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1943); Schreiner v. Mc-
Cory, 186 F. Supp. 819 (D. Neb. 1960).
8. 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944).
9. Id. at 410 (Footnotes omitted).
10. 358 U.S. 59 (1958).
11. Id. at 61. The dissent in Peurifoy was grounded on the Court's refusal to pass upon the
correct interpretation of the statutory term "home." Justice Douglas stated: "The meaning
of 'home' was expressly left undecided in Flowers but is squarely presented in the instant case.
I disagree with the Commissioner's contention that 'home' is synomymous with the sims of
the employer's business. Such a construction means that the taxpayer who is forced to travel
from place to place to pursue his trade must carry his home on his back regardless of the fact
that he maintains his family at an abode which meets all accepted definitions of 'home.'"
Peurifoy v. Commissioner, supra note 10, at 62.
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To this rule, however, the Tax Court has engrafted an exception
which allows a deduction for expenditures of the type made in this case
when the taxpayer's employment is temporary as contrasted with indefi-
nite or indeterminate.12
The courts have defined a "temporary" job as one in which termina-
tion is foreseeable within a fixed or reasonably short period of time. 3
However, as the court stated in Benson v. Godwin:'4
Although many decisions in this area have been based on the dis-
tinction between temporary and indefinite employment, no clear-cut
rules have been established for application to a particular factual situa-
tion.' 5
Conceding difficulty of defining the term "temporary" employment,
as opposed to "indefinite" employment, most courts now seem to agree
that if a business trip is for a temporary period of time, the taxpayer is
entitled to a travelling expense deduction.'" The rule is based upon the
theory that if the taxpayer's "away from home" employment is temporary,
it would be unreasonable to expect him to shift his residence for such a
temporary time.'
7
In Suzanne Waggener,s the tax court did not recognize the peti-
tioner's claim as falling within the "temporary employment" exception
as set forth by the Supreme Court in Peurifoy. In deciding Suzanne
Waggener for the Commissioner, the court merely followed the three
conditions described in the Flowers case.'9
12. Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958). (Emphasis added.) (Footnotes
omitted.)
13. John J. Harvey, 32 T.C. 1368 (1959); Ford v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1955).
14. 164 F. Supp. 70 (R.D. Ark. 1958).
15. Id. at 71. (Footnotes omitted.)
16. Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); Floyd Garlock, 34 T.C. 611 (1960);
Alois J. Weidekamp, 29 T.C. 16 (1957); Henry C. Warren, 13 T.C. 205 (1949). Cf.
Carragon v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952). A problem is encountered when
employment for a temporary period of time is accepted away from home, but is not prompted
by exigencies of either the employer's or the employee's trade or business. The import of the
Court's words in the Peurifoy case apparently indicates that once employment is accepted
away from home for a temporary period of time, as opposed to an indefinite period of time,
then the exigencies of the business of neither the employer nor the employee need have
prompted the trip to permit a deduction under section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code. However, Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion in the Peurifoy case: "If
the expenses are necessary and appropriate to neither the employer's business nor the employee's
trade, they are personal expenses under § 24(a) (1) (§ 263 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code)." Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 62-63 nA (1958). If Justice Douglas'
dissent is valid, then it would seem that the Peurifoy exception to the tests of the Flowers case
is really no exception at all. Under this interpretation, one would still have to meet the
three tests of the Flowers case to fall under the provisions of section 162 (a) (2) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. The court in Waggener was not called upon to decide this issue since it
was determined that the petitioner had no set tax home when she accepted temporary em-
ployment in Washington.
17. Alois J. Weidekamp, 29 T.C. 16 (1957); Comment, 19 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 534 (1952).
18. Suzanne Waggener, CCH 1963 TAx CT. REP. (22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) Dec. 25902
(M) (Jan. 3, 1963).
19. Ibid.
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